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One Cognitive Style Among Others: 
Towards a Phenomenology of the Lifeworld 
and of Other Experiences 
Gregor Schiemann 
Abstract In his pioneering sociological theory, which makes phenomenological 
concepts fruitful for the social sciences, Alfred Schütz has laid foundations for a 
characterization of an manifold of distinct domains of experience. My aim here is 
to further develop this pluralist theory of experience by buttressing and extending 
the elements of diversity that it includes, and by eliminating or minimizing 
lingering imbalances among the domains of experience. After a critical discussion 
of the criterion-catalogue Schütz develops for the purpose of characterizing 
different cognitive styles, I move on to examine its application to one special style, 
the lifeworld. I appeal, on the one hand, to Husserl's characterization of the lifeworld 
as a world of perception, and on the other hand to the layer-model of the lifeworld 
developed by Schütz and Thomas Luckmann. A consequence of this approach is 
that the lifeworld appears as a socially definable context that is detached from other 
experiences but on an equal footing with them with respect to their claim of validity. 
The term "lifeworld" does not denote a category that encompasses culture or nature 
but refers to a delimited action-space. Finall y, I draw upon Schütz' s criterion-catalogue 
to characterize two domains of experience outside of the lifeworld, which play 
a central roJe for the process of differentiation of experience in modernity and 
for the phenomenological analysis of types of experience: experimental science 
and subjectivity. 
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1 Introduction 
In his pioneering sociological theory, which makes phenomenological concepts 
fruitful for the social sciwces, Alfred Schütz has laid the foundations for a 
characterization of a manifold of distinct domains of experience.1 Alongside 
science and the lifeworld, one can distinguish among others the domains of dreams, 
fantasies, religious practices, children's play and insanity.2 Schütz characterizes 
these different domains by attributing to each its own distinctive "cognitive style" 
[Erkenntnisstil]. His understanding of "cognitive" [erkenntnismäßig] is expressed 
by his view that knowledge is experience that we take to be reat3 "Cognitive," 
here, does not refer to justified belief but, on the contrary, to beliefs that are 
assumed not to require justification because the reality of their objects is taken to 
be sufficiently firm.4 
My aim here is to further develop the pluralist theory of experience by buttressing 
and extending the elements of diversity that it includes, and by eliminating or 
minimizing lingering imbalances among the domains of experience. One of the 
achievements of Schütz's social phenomenology is that the lifeworld, which remains 
the most socially important non-scientific domain of experience, has been estab­
lished as an object of enquiry for sociology.5 Following Edmund Husserl's lifeworld 
analysis, he ascribes a foundational status to this domain, which is an ineliminable 
determinant of all other experiences-partly just as a presupposition, partly as a 
fundamental, universal structural property. 
Schütz justifies the privileging of the status of the lifeworld by appealing to its 
character as a world of working. "Working" [Wirken] refers to all bodily movements 
performed to carry out "action in the outer world, based upon a project,"6 which 
are centered around objects lying within the perceptual· field of an individual. 
The core of the lifeworld includes the telephone that an individual uses, for 
example, as well as the voice of her interlocutor, but not the interlocutor herself. 
Cognitive styles outside of the lifeworld, in contrast, are primarily characterized by 
forms of action that are directed not toward objects of perception but toward past 
impressions, present products of imagination, or abstract entities. They rest upon 
different background presuppositions than the lifeworld, follow from divergent 
social relations, and stand at a certain distance from the demands of everyday life. 
In granting a special status to the lifeworld, Schütz invests his conception with an 
absolute claim to validity, for his conception of the lifeworld refers to an historically 
'On Schütz's sociology, see Natanson (1970); List and Srubar (1988); Embree (1999). 
2 Schütz (1971 ), 266. 
3Ibid., 265. 
4The foundation for this approach are spelled out in "On Multiple Realities" (1945), and "Symbol, 
Reality, and Society" (1955), in: Schütz (1973), 207 ff. and 287 ff. 
5 0n Schütz's theory of the lifeworld, cf. Grathoff and Sprondel (1979); Srubar (1988); Endress, 
Psathas and Nasu (2004). 
6 Schütz ( 1971 ), Vol. I, 243. 
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and culturally invariant structure, without which human life and its various modes 
of experience would be unimaginable.7 One potential advantage of assuming such a 
universal matrix is that it could conceptually do justice to the relatively inalterable 
basic conditions of human life that may obtain. 
If, on the other hand, one conceives of the cognitive styles as products of a 
typically modern process of dijferentiation of experiences, it is no longer possible to 
regard the lifeworld as an unqualified point of reference. Contemporary non­
lifeworld cognitive styles are-I would submit-no longer as integrated within the 
lifeworld as they once were. Instead, they have become autonomous and partially 
professionalized, and attained an inftuence as such upon the lifeworld. Artistic, 
religious, scientific and other modes of experience outside of the lifeworld make the 
lifeworld appear to be unreal. Along with the lifeworld, they form a pluralist 
structure in which different domains border on each other and deterrnine individuals' 
lives with specific intensities and durations. As a rule, individuals are not simultane­
ously in different domains of experience. Action in the lifeworld does not leave 
space for scientific work; dream-worlds extinguish waking consciousness; religious 
practice is not normally acquainted with the open-endedness of fantasy etc. The switch 
from one domain to another, which can already take place several times during one 
single day, implies the possibility of boundary experiences. 
Correcting Schütz's conception of cognitive styles makes it possible to 
distinguish among various autonomous domains of experience. The dissolution of 
the foundational status of the lifeworld leads to a manifold of equally justified 
contexts, which represent the plurality of experiences that is characteristic of 
modernity. The non-lifeworld experiences mentioned by Schütz can be supple­
mented by further cognitive styles belonging, for example, to professional domains, 
to more finely differentiated scientific domains of experience, and to the public 
domain as a generally accessible sphere of societal communication, the objects of 
which are, to speak with Karrt, "whatever necessarily interests everyone,"8 or 
subjectivity as an experience in which a subject's attention is directed toward its 
own conscious events or conscious states. 
Schütz developed a catalogue of criteria for characterizing different cognitive 
styles. There are only a few, easily corrected, places where the catalogue reftects 
Schütz's privileging of the lifeworld. Section 1 will be devoted to presenting a modi­
fied version of the catalogue and illustrating it with examples. Then I take a closer 
look at its application to the lifeworld. I will be drawing, on the one hand, upon 
Husserl's definition of the lifeworld as a world of perception, and on the other hand 
on Schütz's and Thomas Luckmann's leveled model of the lifeworld. Consequently, 
the lifeworld appears as a socially bounded context that is distinct from other, equally 
valid, experiential domains. The term "lifeworld," then, does not refer to a category 
that encompasses the entirety of nature and culture, but to a restricted space of action 
in (next section). Finally, I will use Schütz's catalogue of criteria to characterize two 
7 Cf. Heller (1986), 154. 
8Kant ( 1 900 ff.), Vol. V, B 868. 
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non-lifeworldly domains of experience that play an prominent role in the modern 
process of differentiation of experience and for the phenomenological analysis of 
types of experience: experimental natural science and subjectivity (Sect. 3). 
2 Schütz's Conception of Cognitive Styles 
A "certain set of our experiences" qualifies as "a finite province of meaning" 
according to Schütz, "if all of them show a specific cognitive style and are-with 
respect to this style-not only consisterit in themselves but also compatible with one 
another. "9 Schütz can refer to a domain of meaning as "finite" because the condition 
of compatibility does not apply among cognitive styles: "that which is compatible 
with the province of meaning P be also compatible within the province of meaning 
Q."10  For Schütz, it is by virtue of the lifeworld that communication among domains 
of meaning is nevertheless possible. 11 
The expression "cognitive style" makes it clear that Schütz is not so much 
interested in the content as in the form of knowledge. The term "cognitive" does not 
refer only to true beliefs but also to "valid as well as the invalidated [experiences],"1 2 
insofar as they exhibit the same style and are thus held with conviction to be real. 
The exclusive restriction to domains of meaning, however, invests the concept of 
knowledge with a statical character that underestimates the significance of bound­
ary experiences, which alone enable the transformation of the conditions for the 
constitution of meaning. If one presupposes a division among domains of meaning, 
experiences arising from an overlap of cognitive styles can result either from the 
transgression or from the dissolution of borders. Schütz describes such experiences 
with a terminology that is also suitable for the transition between incommensurable 
worlds. Thus, the shift between domains of meaning does not occur gradually but 
suddenly, and is connected with an emotional shudder that Schütz compares with 
"Kierkegaard's experience of the 'instand' as the leap." 13 Among other things, the 
"shock of falling asleep as the leap into the world of dreams; the inner transformation 
we endure if the curtain in the theater rises [ . . .  ] ; the radical change in our attitude 
if, before a painting, we permit our visual field to be limited by what is within the 
frame [ . . .  ], our quandary, relaxing into laughter, if, in listening to a joke, we are for 
a short time ready to accept the fictitious world of the jest as a reality."14 
9Schütz (1971), Vol. I, 264. 
101bid., 397 (267). 
11 Ibid., 296ff., 392 and 395. 
121bid., 265. 
13 lbid., 266 (267). 
14 lbid., 266 (397f.). 
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In order to make it possible to characterize conceptually "at least some of the 
features"15 of the cognitive styles specific to domains of meaning, Schütz formulated 
his catalogue of criteria. As already noted, I will be making some modifications to 
the catalogue that result from criticism of the foundational status Schütz attributed 
to the lifeworld. In its social-phenomenological orientation, the catalogue presup­
poses an egological structure that rests upon subjective experience (which Schütz 
does not invest with a specific cognitive style), and then integrates phenomena of 
intersubjectivity. The catalogue of criteria includes six features, the concise 
definitions of which are supplemented by Schütz with examples to illustrate their 
relationship with the domains of meaning. 16 
1. The foundational criterion, modeled upon Bergson's "attention a Ia vie," is the 
so-called "tension of consciousness,"17 which is understood as an "orienting 
toward and attending to life."18 Schütz distinguishes various intensities of 
attention, as well as various resultant degrees of reality. Since it is "the meaning 
of experience and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitutes 
reality," reality is dependant upon the attentional structures of the conscious.1 9 
Following Bergson, Schütz ascribes to the lifeworld the highest degree of 
attention, the "wide-awakeness,"20 and to the dream-world the lowest degree, a 
merely "passive attention."21 By characterizing "wide-awakeness" with refer­
ence to "normal [ . . .  ] adults",22 Schütz distinguishes the lifeworld from fantasy 
worlds-which he also regards as characteristic for children-and from worlds 
of (pathological) insanity. I will be adopting this point of reference, along with 
the attention toward extemal objects, as a criterion for the lifeworld's intuitive 
orientation, and will be using Husserl's concept of perception in order to 
fine-tune it to this orientation. 
In order to revoke the privileged status of the lifeworld, it is necessary to 
abandon the ranking of attentional intensities as a means of individuating cognitive 
styles. The principally equal justification of cognitive styles implies that they have 
equivalent possibilities for validity claims upon reality. By no means, however, 
does this undermine the necessity of the criterion of tension of consciousness. 
For all cognitive styles remain "names [ . . .  ] of one and the same consciousness, 
and it is the same life [ . . .  ], which is attended to in different modifications."23 
15lbid., 265. 
16This presentation of the criterion catalogue follows Schiemann (2002), 86ff. 
17 Schütz (1971 ), Vol. I, 243ff. and 265, in the original not emphasized, as for all further character­
izations of the criteria. 
'8Jbid., 243. 
191bid., 264 (393). 
20Ibid., 265. 
21 lbid., 244. 
22 Schütz and Luckmann (1979), 4 7. 
23 Schütz (1971 ), Vol. I, 297. 
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Taking part in the "stream of consciousness" is thus a necessary condition for 
cognitive styles that could not otherwise determine the experiential space of one 
individual with varying intensities and duration. 
2. The next criterion is concerned with different contents of attention, and captures 
the "prevalent form of spontaneity" within a cognitive domain.24 Unlike the 
tension of consciousness, which refers to an internal attitude, it marks out a 
relation between the subject's working and the experiences she takes to be real. 
The distinctions among forms of spontaneity arise from the qualitative experiential 
differences between thinking and conducting [Verhalten], and between acting 
[Handlung] and not acting. Among the forms of thinking action, for example, 
fantasizing differs from contemplation by virtue of the absence of any intention 
to make the fantasy reaL25 Moreover, dreaming lacks a structuring of action, as 
the subject does not have the freedom to direct the flow of events.26 Hence, 
dreaming is neither an experience of being conducting nor one of performing 
actions. The paradigm of a subject performing actions is the lifeworld. As already 
noted, its prevalent spontaneity is, for Schütz, working [Wirken]. 
Following Oswald Schwemmer, I would like to further restriet the spontane­
ity prevalent of the lifeworld by pointing to its unprofessionality. Lifeworldly 
action can "just as well be performed by and expected of others as from us," 
since we "attribute competency in principle to everyone.'m With this further 
characteristic, the scope of lifeworldly action becomes far narrower, and the 
lifeworld loses its status as universal mediator for communication among 
the cognitive domains. This characterization can probably be connected with the 
following, negative, criterion of the "epoche." 
3. Although the word "epochr is borrowed from Husserl, Schütz uses it in a 
different way, namely to refer to the bracketing or suspending of particular 
aspects of reality.28 Schütz adds a hierarchization, similar to that of the tensions 
of consciousness, when he claims that it is only in the lifeworld that all doubts 
about reality are suspended and it is accepted as self-evident.29 Nevertheless, this 
ranking does not lead to the privileging of the lifeworld, as the doubts about the 
validity of reality in other domains of experience apply only to particular phe­
nomena. To formulate it as a paradox: the general epoche of the lifeworld, which 
is characterized by a complete absence of doubt, is the specifically lifeworldly 
epoche. For other domains of meaning, Schütz hirnself introduces examples of 
specific epoches: thus, dreaming experience is not concerned with the validity of 
24 lbid., 265. 
25 lbid., 270. 
26lbid., 277. 
27 Schwemmer ( 1987), 207. 
28 Schütz (1971 ), Vol. I, 263 and 265. 
29 Ibid., 265 and 268. 
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"certain logical axioms"30; scientific reflection puts aside, among other aspects, 
the bodily existence of the researcher "as psycho-physical human being".31 
4. While the characteristics mentioned so far have to do with the subjective 
constitution of objects and meaning, the next one introduces the specific "form 
of sociality"32 as a further definitional feature. Roughly speaking, it distinguishes 
the domains of meaning that are experience exclusively alone (e.g., dreams, con­
templation) from those that can be experience only together (e.g., lifeworld) also 
from those that can be experienced alone or together (e.g. fantasy, religion and, 
according to Schütz, science). On Schütz's view, as I will elucidate further below, 
the familiar/well-known essence of lifeworldly social forms results from a mini­
malization of the typification of social relations. 
5. Possibilities for the production of complex relational networks within and 
between domains of meaning are opened up by the two final criteria: 
"time-perspectives" and "experiencing one's self."33 The criterion of different 
"time-perspectives" is closely tied to the aforementioned criterion of sociality. It 
refers to the objective time of the world that is beyond control, to biological 
times (bodily rhythms, seasons, etc.), to individual biographical time, to the sub­
jective time of the stream of consciousness with intemal duration, and to the 
social time of the calendar and standardized intersubjective time. 34 
6. The criterion of "experiencing one's self,"35 which I merely mention here, 
postulates the emergence of patterns of personal identification that are 
specific to different domains of meaning and that are dependent upon validity 
elements to reality. 
3 The Lifeworld as a Restricted Perceptual World 
Three of the characteristics formulated by Schütz can be conceived as necessary 
criteria for the lifeworld's cognitive style: "wide-awakeness" as a specific tension 
of consciousness; the prevalent form of spontaneity characterized by unprofessional 
action that is directed toward objects within the perceptual field of an individual; 
and the specific epoche that places the validity of reality beyond doubt.36 The 
lifeworldly form of sociality discussed by Schütz, namely familiar/well-known 
30lbid., 279. 
31 lbid., 286. 
32lbid., 265. 
33 Ibid., 265. 
34Schütz and Luckmann (1979), Vol. I, 73. 
35 Schütz (1971 ), Vol. I, 265. 
36The concept of a context of lifeworldly experience, which draws upon Husserl and Schütz, has 
been elucidated further in Schiemann (2005), chapter 1.1.2. Along with a given background 
knowledge, the three criteria form a sufficient condition for lifeworldly experience, cf. ibid. 
Chapter 1.1.2, paragraph 3.1.2. 
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intersubjectivity, does not in my view count among the necessary criteria, since 
individuals (such as Robinson Crusoe) can also live alone in a lifeworld. Insofar as 
an individual has a perceptual world bound to its body, that perceptual world deter­
mines the familiarity and intuitiveness of the things that can be altered by direct 
(unprofessional) actions. What an individual of course conceives as a uniform world 
constitutes a subjective lifeworld, around which are concentrically arranged spheres 
of what can only be experienced indirectly. There are as many subjective lifeworlds 
as there are normal adult individuals, and as many shared lifeworlds as made 
possible by the integration of different subjective worlds into unified worlds in 
social action spaces. 
In order to give a more precise characterization of the lifeworldly tension of 
consciousness, the next step will be to base the specific epoche upon Busserl's 
notion of perception. Lifeworldly attention has to do primarily with perception of 
the outer world of bodies that is not symbolically mediated. This characterization 
will make it possible for me to apply Schütz's and Luckmann's layered model for 
specifying the prevalent forms of spontaneity, time-perspective, and sociality. 
The absence of-or freedom from-doubt leads to the emergence of a core of 
unshakable certainties, the objects of which are not any particular contents but the 
validity of the world. This self-evident world-belief is what Busserl refers to as a 
"general thesis ofthe natural attitude" [ Generalthesis der natürlichen Einstellung]. 37 
The lifeworld is unquestioningly accepted as a unity and as existence that is inde­
pendent of the act of knowing. Busserl's general thesis is to a certain extent within 
the Cartesian tradition, insofar as the given world that corresponds to this natural 
attitude is primarily conceived as being given to intuition. Where refl.ection about 
experience or knowledge does not occur, it is the testimony of perception that 
dominates. The lifeworld is the "world of perception," because it is a world that is 
taken as self-evident in its being.38 "Perception," refers exclusively to the "mode of 
self-presence" of an appearing object, which Busserl calls the "original mode of 
intuition," [Urmodus der Anschauung] in contrast to the recollective or anticipatory 
intuition of a currently absent object. 39 This "originally giving" [originär gebende] 
experience is oriented toward "mere bodiliness."40 "Through sight, touch, audition, 
etc., bodily things are simply there for me in the different ways appropriate to the 
various senses and in some particular spatial distribution."41 In this sense, the 
lifeworld encompasses the things within the visible surroundings of the subject that 
are currently present and point as signs to an Other. In a broader sense, it also 
extends to things that are invisible, occluded or absent at the moment but are present 
in memory in a "conscious sense" [bewußtseinsmäßig].42 
37 Husserl ( 1977), 63f.-also emphasized in the original. 
38 Husserl ( 1976), 49f., 171; Husserl (1968), 58f. 
39 Husserl (1976), 107. 
40 Husserl (1948), 54. 
41 Husserl (1977), 57. 
42 Ibid. 
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Busserl applies the general thesis not only to the "world of things" [Sachenwelt]. 
The same world is there "in the same immediacy as world of values, world of goods, 
practical world."43 In the lifeworld, bodies do not appear independently of their 
cultural, social and practical evaluations-and neither, in turn, do these evaluations 
attain an autonomous existence: "In order for something to be given as usable, beau­
tiful, terrible, frightful, attractive or whatever eise, it must be somehow present to 
the senses."44 The perception of meaning presupposes the perception of bodies, 
which is why the lifeworld remains, even from a socio-cultural perspective, primarily 
a world of perception.45 
In subscribing to the assumption of bodily primacy, I conceptualize the lifeworld 
as a cognitive style that is founded upon the achievements of outer perception. 
Schütz and Luckmann have used the term "stratifications" [Aufschichtungen] to 
refer to the structures of such a domain of experience. I will be using this model in 
order to specify the circle of necessary conditions for a restricted social context. In 
so doing, I will be pursuing the strategy of limiting the scope of the claims to valid­
ity of the definitions I am borrowing from Schütz and Luckmann in order to make 
space for consideration of experientially different contexts. The spatial stratification 
specifies the prevalent spontaneity of direct action that is characteristic of the life­
world and which takes on foremost significance in a world of perception. Schütz 
and Luckmann, who characterize the lifeworld through socially mediated as weil as 
through immediate experience, follow the same ranking. The temporal and social 
stratifications confirm the structural features of the spatial stratification and provide 
additional definitions. 
3.1 Spatial Stratification 
The centerpoint of the spatial structure is the locus of the bodily presence of the 
lifeworldly subject. The scope of its direct actions spans the so-called "primary zone 
of efficacy" [primäre Wirkzone]. This zone contains all the things and people that 
the subject can influence solely through bodily movement (within a present that 
spans a certain time interval)-including the use of technical devices (tools, means 
of locomotion, etc.). A "secondary zone of efficacy" [sekundäre Wirkzone] includes 
the use of technical devices to alter bodies outside of the primary zone. The primary 
zone is entirely, and the secondary zone partially, within the sphere of perceptible 
things. The "world currently within reach" [Welt der aktuellen Reichweite], which 
is made up of these two zones, can be divided according to sensory modalities 
(what is visible in the distance can only seldom be smelled, whereas what can be 
smelled generally has a broader spatial range than what can be touched or tasted, etc.). 
43Ibid., 59-emphasized also in the original. 
44 Husserl (1948), 53. 
45 Ibid., 55. 
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It borders upon the "world potentially within reach [Welt der potentiellen Reichweite]," 
which includes objects that are not currently present but can be in the future.46 
The notion of spatial stratification can be illustrated with the example of a 
student's domestic workspace (which may be sufficiently similar to Husserl's rather 
inadmissibly tidy lifeworld): her primary zone of efficacy includes the computer 
she was just using a moment ago as well as the part of the speaker and door opener 
she is presently using. The secondary zone of efficacy contains visible and invisible 
things: the door-opening mechanism itself (invisible), the front door (partially 
visible) and the person outside who just rang the doorbell (invisible). Along with the 
inventory of the primary zone of efficacy, the world that is currently within the 
student's reach also contains perceptible objects outside of the action-radius­
including, for example, objects that her gaze falls upon outside the window (houses 
across the street, distant stretches of landscape ). It does not however include the 
person who has not yet entered, although this person may be part of the world 
potentially within reach. None of these worlds contains invisible components of 
mechanical-electronic devices, such as keyboards and speakers, unless the user has 
an interest in their function and would thus draw them into the world potentially 
or even currently within her reach. As far as modern technical devices are 
concerned, the lifeworld is a world of button-pushing. It is only concerned with 
relevant in- and outputs, and does not normally extend beyond the surface of 
technical apparatuses. 
3.2 Temporal Stratijication 
The temporal structures of the lifeworld that Schütz and Luckmann investigate are 
exceedingly complex, and can be contrasted with other closed domains of meaning 
by virtue of the flowing together of otherwise separate forms of time.47 The spatial 
stratification in fact already implies the basic structure of the temporal stratification: 
the present occurs primarily in the world that is currently within reach; future events 
and (shared) experiences make up the world that is potentially within reach. 
The state of the world beyond its potentially reach effects a subject in a different 
way temporally than spatially. Whatever is spatially out of reach tends to escape her 
interest and also her knowledge. Lifeworlds, in their essential locality, are only mar­
ginally involved with distaut events. Of the events that are temporally out of reach, 
however, there are two that have unconditional significance for individual subjects: 
one's own birth and death. One cannot have any direct lifeworldly contact with 
these events.48 One knows about them only through the accounts of others, and 
assumes that one's own birth and death must be similar to those of others. Of course, 
46Schütz and Luckmann (1979), Vol. I, 63ff. 
47 lbid., 73ff. 
48 lbid., 74f. 
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the mediacy of these experiences is not symmetrical. One's own birth is far more 
removed from one's experience than one's death, which announces its approach in 
bodily aging and dying. 
For Busserl, Schütz and Luckmann, the transcendence of birth and death is the 
basis of the strict generational orientation of a lifeworldly context, in which much 
older and much younger people appear only at the margins. The zenith of efficacy 
of one's predecessors, which is manifest in cultural achievements, belongs to the 
past, while the coming generation participates in adult life only partially. 
3.3 Social Stratijication 
According to Schütz's and Luckmann's starting premise, each individual subject 
assumes unquestioningly "that other men exist."49 The social stratification deals 
with a differentiation of social experience according to degrees of anonymity: 
anonymity stands in, so to speak, an inversely proportional relation to the immediacy 
of experience, while no social experience is so immediate that it could do entirely 
without the application of anonymous definitions. "Anonymity" refers to typologies 
that are applied to people, i.e. the formation and use of types for identifying 
people ("our mailman Mr. Martin," "an enemy of the people," etc.).50 It concems 
aspects of actions less in the primary zone of efficacy than in the world potentially 
within reach. 
For Schütz and Luckmann, the reach of the socially stratified lifeworld fades off 
into indeterminacy. They impute not only the weakest but even the strongest forms 
of mediacy of social experience to the lifeworld, which retains its midpoint but 
extends to the entire social and cultural world. Such radical openness corresponds, 
on the one hand, to the horizonedness [Horizonthaftigkeit] of lifeworldly experi­
ence, on the other hand it precludes a classification of social experience in which 
lifeworldly experience stands alongside other kinds of experience. In contrast to 
Schütz and Luckmann, I would therefore like to apply the criterion of anonymity in 
such as way as to highlight the part of the social world that is already restricted 
by the spatial stratification. Anonymity should deliver definitions that make it 
possible to distinguish at least roughly between people with whom one shares a 
lifeworld and people who appear in one's lifeworld but do not properly belong to it. 
In carrying out such a demarcation, it is possible to build upon Schütz's and 
Luckmann's conception of the lifeworld as a world of perception. Experience in 
which anonyrnity is as minimal as possible can only be had, according to Schütz and 
Luckmann, in "face-to-face situation," i.e. through bodily presence. The term 
for one subject's attentively tuming to the other is the "thou-orientation," and the 
other who is experienced as an equal person is a "fellow being" [Mitmensch]. 
49lbid., 87. 
500n lifeworldly typologies, cf. Schiemann (2005), chapter 1.1.2, paragraph 3.1.2. 
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Whenever this orientation is mutual, the social relationship can be called a 
"we-relationship."51 
We-relationships can be classified according to the degree of anonymity. The more 
concrete, detailed and presumably also persevering an unmediated social relationship 
is, the less important typologies become in the "thou-orientation."52 The alter ego may 
appear as a singular individual that cannot be captured adequately by any typology at 
all. Higher degrees of anonymity arise through the successive replacement of immedi­
ate social experience by typologies. In the extreme case, typologies can fully take the 
place of social experience. Since we-relationships depend upon a tuming of attention 
for which typologies can provide no substitute, they are progressively destroyed by 
increasing anonymity. It is in we-relationships with minimal degrees of anonymity 
that I see the essential social feature of the shared lifeworld. 
3.4 A Proto-Concluding Characterization 
As a world of perception, the subjective and the shared lifeworlds have a centric 
nature. The shared lifeworld, which has been the focus here, appears to individu­
als as a familiar social space in which they linger sometimes with more attention 
and sometimes with less, but which they can also sometimes leave and to which 
they can again return. One knows the objects and people in one's lifeworld on 
their own terms. That is the way in which they remain in one's memory when they 
are no Ionger present or when one is outside of one's lifeworld (while dreaming or 
fantasizing, while being in public, at work, etc.). Other spaces of experience are 
layered upon the lifeworld in varying degrees of familiarity, and partially overlap 
with it. Persons, which enter the lifeworldly domain coming out of these spaces of 
experience, remain distincted from the lifeworld at first. Since everything that 
belongs to the lifeworld must be perceptible, its temporal modus is essentially the 
present. The past is the source the experiences come that make perception possi­
ble and orientate action, and it is toward the future that desires, expectations and 
action plans are directed. 
As an equal cognitive style alongside others, the lifeworld does not lose its 
foundational significance for the conceptualization of processes of modernization. 
Increasing professionalization can only be understood against the backdrop of the 
existing unprofessional spaces of experience, which find their very core in the 
re-defined lifeworld. Moreover, the integration of the lifeworld into a manifold of 
differing domains of meaning offers the possibilities for conceiving of the lifeworld 
as a cultural phenomenon that arises only within a plurality of historically changing 
lifeworlds. The cultural-historical process of differentiation of experience Ieads to a 
multiplication of non-lifeworldly cognitive styles. 
51 Schütz and Luckmann (1979), Vol. I, 90f. 
52 lbid., 95ff. 
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Using examples of two non-lifeworldly experiences-experimental natural 
science and subjectivity-1 would now like to discuss the application of Schütz's 
criterion catalogue to the demarcation of different cognitive styles. Schütz and 
Luckmann never mention these two experiential contexts as closed domains of 
meaning. Only in a few places do they speak-very generally-about science and 
about the "scientific contemplation" that they impute to science.53 Without being 
able to give any convincing justification, Schütz contrasts the latter with the 
lifeworld. Moreover, his understanding of scientific contemplation has less in 
common with cognitive styles found in the sciences than with Husserl's concept 
of subjective experience.54 
Since Schütz and Luckmann do not consider subjectivity as a closed domain of 
meaning, they overlook the constitutive significance that this cognitive style has for 
modern self-understanding. In his persuasive study of modern forms of identity, 
Charles Taylor refers to what he calls the three "sources of the self'': alongside the 
"voice of nature" and the "affirmation of ordinary life" that is bound up with the 
lifeworld, there is also the "inwardness" that characterizes the demarcation of reason 
from the outside world as weil as its formation as an autonomous site of knowledge 
and action.55 The mainstream discourse on subjectivity in early modemity got 
underway with a ritual turning away from the lifeworld, which opened up newfound 
space for loneliness.56 Subjectivity soon became the subject of methodological 
analyses, which subsequently inftuenced introspective procedures in psychology 
(Wundt, James, Titchener and the Würzburg school with Külpe) as weil as phenom­
enological method of reduction (Husserl).57 Finally, it has, as a space of sensory 
qualities, experienced an unanticipated renaissance in the past few decades in the 
philosophy of mind.58 
4.1 Experimental Natural Science 
Schütz's concept of a cognitive style offers the possibility of a classification within 
the plurality of modern modes of experience in the first approximation. Thus, the 
uniform characterization of the experience that is characteristic for experimental 
science is also only sensible by virtue of the contrast to other cognitive styles. 
53 Ibid., 48f., 356ff.; Schütz (1971), Vol. I, 28 lff. 
54Cf. Schiemann (2002). 
55Taylor (1992), 109ff., 207ff. I use the concept of modernity here in a sense that encompasses 
modernity in its contempary period; cf. Schiemann (2009). 
56 Cf. Bürger (1998). 
57Varela and Shear ( 1999). 
58Smith and Thomasson (2005); Kriege! and Williford (2006). 
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It cannot claim to do justice to the diversity of scientific methods, domains and 
conceptions. A conceptual demarcation of experimental science is of crucial 
importance. These disciplines have been a-perhaps the-motor driving the 
scientification and technologization that is characteristic of modemity. 
Experimental procedures in the natural sciences present a context of purposive­
rational action, which aims to state or to create phenomena, and serves to develop, 
evaluate or criticize knowledge of objectifiable reality.59 lt is found in just about all 
natural sciences and can be invoked as their defining feature. The term "phenome­
non" here refers to events, processes or states that are expected or that have been 
demonstrated to admit of conceptual description, to appear regularly under the 
appropriate conditions, and to accessible to theoretical explanation. In a broader 
sense, it can also (or altematively) be used to refer to regularity itself. Thus, the 
experimental creation of phenomena need not impose any particular conception 
upon them. Countless phenomena have indeed been discovered in experiments that 
were not devised with that aim. In general, it can be said that the minimization of 
parameters and variables that is necessary for the systematic investigation of phe­
nomena necessitates a demarcation of the objects of the experiment from their sur­
roundings. In order to fulfill this condition optimally, experiments are often 
conducted in technically manipulable apparatuses. Experimental phenomena are 
perceived or observed. "Perception" refers to the acquisition of sensory impressions 
from extemal bodies, such as also are encountered in the lifeworld. "Observation," 
on the other hand, is the empirical referral to theoretical entities (electrons, atoms, 
genes, black holes, etc.) that is mediated by the apparatus. Many scientific experiments 
have to do with properties that are too small, too !arge, too distaut or too transient 
for perception. If Observations can be made with the help of or through measurement 
devices, sensory perception may be limited to reading information from dials or 
other presentations of results, i.e. interchangeable representations of data of theoretical 
entities. Observations, however, are also mediated by the senses insofar as they 
arise through actions. The ongoing automatization of experimental techniques has 
however made forms of observation possible that are only peripherally or not at all 
dependent upon human perception. 
The aforementioned condition of demarcation from the surroundings allows 
for a spatio-temporal localization of experiments. lts intended claim to validity is, 
however, not local but universal. Scientific knowledge is supposed to be testable 
under reproducible conditions, and stakes a claim upon unrestricted intersubjective 
validity. This claim to universality is matched by the boundary expanding structure 
of research organizations. The bearers of experimental science are not single indi­
viduals but the worldwide, networked "scientific communities" of the various 
disciplines. The knowledge they produce has only a relative objectivity, though, 
insofar as experimental science-like science in general-is essentially a socio­
cultural endeavour. Hence, scientists follow changeable and replaceable "thought 
styles" (Ludwik Fleck) in their beliefs, or they organize their work within 
59For overviews of recent Iiterature on experimentation, see Heidelberger and Steinle (1988); 
Radder (2002). 
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changeable and replaceable "paradigms" (Thomas S. Kuhn). Under these historically 
contingent conditions, the predominant rationality of the experimental sciences 
has proven itself to be instrumental. It answers, roughly speaking, partly to the 
inner dynamics of acquisition of knowledge through problem-solving, partly to 
the extemal societal factors that support or hinder the development of methods 
and investigations of object-domains. 
This admittedly rather rudimentary description of experimental science can be 
re-formulated and made more precise with the terrninology of Schütz 's criterion 
catalogue. Experimental science shares the "wide-awakeness" of acting subjects that 
is characteristic of the lifeworld and inscribed in the first criterion of tension of con­
sciousness. But this attentional intensity can in the context of experiments be directed 
to things that function as signs for results that cannot themselves be accessed percep­
tually, as the discussion of observation showed. It follows that the spatial structure of 
experimental design does not necessarily point back to perceptual conditions. Rather, 
it varies with institutional, methodological and object-dependent requirements. The 
spectrum can span from a narrowly bounded locality up to an earth encompassing 
global Ievel. Modem communication systems make it possible to carry out experi­
ments, if necessary, in spatially very disparate locations, and to evaluate the data 
somewhere eise altogether. The second criterion, too, is relatively independent of the 
reach of an individual's perceptual field: the prevalent spontaneity of experimental 
action is directed toward the design, the execution and the evaluation of experiments, 
as weil as to the development and application of the attendant conceptual and theo­
retical constructions. Successful experiments demand a high-degree of professional­
ism in practical and systematic respects, which is normally guided by thought styles 
or paradigms. As an example of the specific epoche, the third criterion, Schütz men­
tions the bracketing of the bodily existence of the researcher as a "psycho-physical 
human being" (see above). Theform of sociality, the fourth criterion, describes the 
organization in "scientific communities." If the experimental praxis also requires an 
ability that may resemble lifeworldly forms of action, the claim to universality, on the 
other hand, requires the interchangeability of acting subjects. Finally, the definitions 
discussed so far, and the Iimits of their applicability to the diversity of varieties of 
experimental science, are reflected in the final criterion of specific time-perspectives. 
A common element could be portrayed more closely with Hans Blumenberg's 
concept of "world-time" as "core of all conceivable chronologies" and contrasted 
with the "life-time" typical of everyday praxis.60 
4.2 Subjectivity 
Subjective experience is experience in which a subject's attention is directed 
toward her own conscious events or states in experiencing or reflecting upon them. 
Husserl's transeendental epoche is one example of subjective experience, as are the 
forms of affective involvement (Betroffenheit) and of self-consciousness with 
60Blumenberg (1986). 
46 G. Schiemann 
self-attribution described by Hermann Schmitz.61 People to whom subjective 
experience is ascribed have privileged access to that experience. Their reports have 
the status of uncorrectability, and are given in the first-person singular. The features 
of the corresponding cognitive style are related in a partially complementary fashion 
to those of the lifeworld.62 
The direction of the tension of consciousness is, so to speak, contrary to that of the 
lifeworld: in the lifeworld, attention is directed toward external objects of perception, 
whereas, in the case of subjectivity, it is directed to one's own conscious states (Sensa­
tions, perceptions, thoughts, attitudes, moods, etc.), which are withdrawn from their 
everyday, practical meaning. Whereas the locus of bodily presence is the immovable 
midpoint of the spatial strJcture of the lifeworld, it can be left aside in subjective 
experience. Thoughts that are not tied up with perception and sensations are free of 
the necessity of a spatial localization. It is possible to go to a particular location merely 
in thought, or to be lost in thought and forget one's actual physical location. While the 
prevalent spontaneity of a person in the lifeworld aims toward specific interventions 
in an external world that is shared with fellow human beings, in subjective experience 
it is conducted as an invisible act within the inner world of consciousness, and does 
not primarily have an agentive but, rather, an experiential or a reflective character. 
Professionalism, which need not be present in the lifeworld, can indeed be formed in 
subjectivity. Individual awareness of one's own inwardness does not presuppose any 
specific competency, because the possibility of its realization is an integral component 
of modern self-understanding. But, on the other hand, the methods of introspection 
and phenomenological reduction, which are available for systematic mental self­
exploration, must be acquired through learning and practice. The subjective epochi 
does not bracket out doubts about the reality of external objects but the practical goals 
that are prominently bound up with them in other worlds. The questions that arise 
within a subjective cognitive style are not concerned with properties of perceived 
objects that are relevant for action but with the experiential qualities, thoughts or prop­
ositional attitudes that are connected with perception, how their mode of presentation 
depends upon spatio-temporal position, etc. With respect to its form of sociality, 
subjective experience is not communalized but essentially lonesome experience, and 
not limitlessly shareable with other people. Time-perspectives, finally, focus upon 
dimensions of inner time-consciousness that are not at issue within the lifeworld. 
5 Conclusion 
In order to illustrate Schütz's conception of cognitive styles, I have discussed three 
domains of meaning that are of significance for modern processes of differentiation 
of experience: the lifeworld can be seen as the core of unprofessionalized spaces 
61 Schmitz (1990). 
62The definitions belanging to a subjective context of experience were developed in Schiemann 
(2005), Chap. 1.2.2, and are discussed critically in relation to Schütz's concept of "scientific 
contemplation" in Schiemann (2002). 
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of experience, experimental natural science is to be regarded as a central motor 
driving scientification and technologization, subjectivity is foundational for human 
self-understanding today. 
The three areas, however, also have particular relevance for phenomenological 
analysis. Traditionally, the phenomenology of the lifeworld coming from Husserl 
has been accorded a foundational role in two senses: it has been thought to present 
the foundation of human experience in general and of scientific knowledge in par­
ticular. Against this characterization, which conflicts with the currently predomi­
nant plurality of experience, I have drawn upon Schütz in order to establish not only 
the lifeworld but also experimental science as autonomaus contexts. 
Husserl was right in pointing out that the analysis of the lifeworld must avail 
itself of a perspective external to the lifeworld. This insight must be generalized in 
two respects. Every analysis of a domain of experience requires a reference point 
that does not lie in the domain. The plurality of experience delivers just such refer­
ence points by bringing out the differences among various cognitive styles. 
Subjectivity-the decisive domain of meaning for the phenomenological analysis of 
the lifeworld-is among them. Subjectivity is no more a privileged context than the 
lifeworld. lt is not the "subjectivity that creates all world-validities with their 
contents and in all pre-scientific and scientific ways."63 Rather, it corresponds to a 
cognitive style that other experiences do not require exclusively for their validity. 
It owes its existence to an attitude that can be taken by anyone, with or without 
practice, and which can be more or less beneficial.64 Subjectivity is in this sense a 
generally accessible cognitive style, but one that can be experienced only individually 
and which is typical for modern self-understanding. 
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T he Infinite Science of the Lifeworld: Steps 
Toward a Postfoundational Phenomenology 
Giovanni Leghissa 
Abstract This essay eonsiders the problern of historieity together with the 
paradoxes of foundation. The eoneept of lifeworld has been studied rnainly in order 
to clarify two orders of problerns, the first eoneerning the relationship between 
history and the lifeworld, the second eoneerning the paradoxes eontained in the 
Krisis regarding the possibility to attain a new foundation of transeendental 
phenornenology. Both issues rnust be taken into eonsideration before we question 
the possibility of a scienee of the lifeworld. 
1 The Problem of Historicity and the Paradoxes 
of Foundation 
The eoneept of lifeworld has been studied rnainly in order to clarify two orders of 
problerns, the first eoneerning the relationship between history and the lifeworld, 
the seeond eoneerning the paradoxes eontained in the Krisis regarding the possibil­
ity to attain a new foundation of transeendental phenomenology. Both issues rnust 
be taken into eonsideration before we question the possibility of a scienee of the 
lifeworld. 
On the one hand, starting frorn Rieoeur's and Landgrebe's pioneering essays,1 
rnueh attention has been paid to the problern of historicity. The airn was not to show 
how Husserl, a philosopher with strong interests in rnathernaties, sueeeeded in 
strueturing a eoherent philosophy of history at the end of his eareer, after deeades 
1 Ricoeur ( 1 949), Landgrebe (1963, 1968, 1982). 
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